The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005-6 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behavior, following league- imposed punishments on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices. Using a difference-in-differences estimation method, we find that home attendances for convicted teams fell by around 16%, relative to those clubs not subject to punishment. We show further that the fall in attendances resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reduc- tions. Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium.
Corruption does not pay: An analysis of consumer response to Italy's Calciopoli scandal
Migali G;
2016-01-01
Abstract
The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005-6 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behavior, following league- imposed punishments on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices. Using a difference-in-differences estimation method, we find that home attendances for convicted teams fell by around 16%, relative to those clubs not subject to punishment. We show further that the fall in attendances resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reduc- tions. Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
